The Dynamics of an Open-access Fishery: Baltic Sea Cod

This paper sets up a dynamic open-access model of a single industry exploiting a single resource stock. The model is applied empirically to describe the dynamics of the eastern Baltic Sea cod fishery. The theoretical model is based on the benchmark papers by Smith (1968, 1969). Types of steady state are discussed theoretically and the theory is applied to the eastern Baltic Sea cod fishery. The empirical path the fishery has been following since 1982 is determined and how it relates to the optimal path to steady state is discussed. Comparisons are made to other empirical studies, and the stability of the steady state is evaluated. The paper concludes that the Baltic Sea cod stock likely is on a path to a stable steady state, and it might not be a problem that the stock is below safe biological limits.Baltic sea cod, bio-economics, dynamic entry/exit, fisheries, open-access, stability of steady state, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Q21, Q22,

Sharing Rules and Stability in Coalition Games with Externalities

This paper examines cooperative sharing rules in fisheries coalition games and develops a new sharing rule that takes into account the stability of cooperation when externalities are present. We contribute to existing knowledge by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stability). As an illustrative example, we describe a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model of the major agents who exploit the cod stock in the Baltic Sea.Baltic Sea cod, characteristic function, coalition game, cooperation, fisheries, nucleolus, Shapley value, sharing rules, stability of cooperation, Environmental Economics and Policy, C62, C70, Q22, Q28,